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ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND THE CONFLICT 
BETWEEN RULE 68 AND THE CLEAN 
WATER ACT’S CITIZEN SUIT PROVISION 
Daniel E. Burgoyne*
Abstract: Environmental “citizen suit” statutes provide incentives for 
citizens to bring enforcement actions by awarding successful plaintiffs 
reasonable attorneys’ fees. Defendants have attempted to use Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 68 to block a successful plaintiff’s recovery of at-
torneys’ fees. Under Rule 68, defendants may offer to allow a judgment 
to be issued against them for a ªxed dollar amount. Plaintiffs may either 
accept this judgment offer or proceed to trial. If plaintiffs proceed to 
trial, however, they must receive a judgment more favorable than the of-
fer or pay the defendants’ litigation costs. Defendants argue that the 
word “costs” as used in Rule 68 applies to attorneys’ fees in addition to 
other litigation costs. If so, the use of Rule 68 can have a great inºuence 
on the economics of citizen suit litigation. This Note explores whether 
or not Rule 68 should be read to apply to attorneys’ fees in citizen suits 
under the Clean Water Act and other environmental statutes. 
Introduction 
 In February 2002, two environmental organizations in North Caro-
lina sued the owners of a tract of land—adjacent to wetlands—for al-
leged violations of various provisions of the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act,1 commonly known as the Clean Water Act (CWA).2 The 
plaintiffs in North Carolina Shellªsh Growers Ass’n v. Holly Ridge Associates 3 
were among the many citizens and environmental groups to have util-
ized section 505 of the CWA, which allows any person to ªle a “citizen 
suit” against persons or entities who violate the Act and awards success-
ful plaintiffs reasonable attorneys’ fees for their efforts.4
                                                                                                                      
* Symposium Editor, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2005–
06. 
1 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2000). 
2 N.C. Shellªsh Growers Ass’n v. Holly Ridge Assocs., 278 F. Supp. 2d 654, 660 
(E.D.N.C. 2003). 
3 Id. 
4 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d). 
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 Approximately nine months later, the defendants served upon 
the plaintiffs an offer of judgment pursuant to Rule 68 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure in which the defendants offered to enter into 
a consent decree to settle the suit.5 If the plaintiffs had rejected the 
offer and received a judgment less favorable at trial, Rule 68 takes 
from plaintiffs the award of attorneys’ fees to which they would have 
otherwise been entitled.6
 Because attorneys’ fees often represent a signiªcant amount of 
money, the plaintiffs responded by ªling a motion for a declaration 
that the Rule 68 offer was null and void.7 The plaintiffs argued that 
Rule 68 “would have a chilling effect upon the willingness of plaintiffs 
to maintain [citizen suits] and would therefore frustrate the purposes 
of Congress” in enacting the citizen suit provision.8 However, the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in Marek v. Chesny appears to reject this ar-
gument.9 In this 1985 decision, the Court rejected a similar argument 
with regards to the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act (Civil 
Rights statute). When the result at trial is less favorable than the offer 
of judgment, the Court held that Rule 68 operates to deny plaintiffs 
any award for attorneys’ fees for work done after the offer is re-
jected.10 However, in Holly Ridge, the court virtually ignored Marek and 
found Rule 68 inapplicable to citizen suits under the CWA.11 As a re-
sult, the plaintiffs could reject the defendants’ offer to enter a con-
sent decree and be conªdent that, even if the result at trial was less 
favorable, there would be no adverse effect on the award of post-offer 
attorneys’ fees. 
 This Note argues that the Holly Ridge court erred by failing to ap-
ply the Marek holding to the CWA. While many valid criticisms have 
been levied against the Marek decision, it is still good law. Further-
more, its reasoning, though ºawed, applies to section 505 of the CWA. 
 Part I of this Note explores the history and policies underlying 
environmental citizen suit statutes and the treatment of attorneys’ 
fees under those statutes. Part II examines the workings of Rule 68, 
the limits imposed by the Rules Enabling Act under which Rule 68 
was promulgated, and the key cases interpreting Rule 68. Part III de-
                                                                                                                      
5 Holly Ridge, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 666. 
6 Id. at 666–67. 
7 Id. at 666. 
8 Id. 
9 See 473 U.S. 1, 10, 11 (1985). 
10 Id. at 10. 
11 See Holly Ridge, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 668–69. 
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scribes three cases in which courts have examined how Rule 68 inter-
acts with section 505 of the CWA with respect to attorneys’ fees. Fi-
nally, Part IV argues that section 505 of the CWA is indistinguishable 
from the U.S. Supreme Court’s analysis of the Civil Rights statute in 
Marek. This Note concludes by suggesting that a change in the law of 
Rule 68 is desirable, but the Marek holding controls the interaction of 
Rule 68 and the CWA until such a change is made. The Marek holding 
requires that when a plaintiff rejects a Rule 68 offer and obtains a 
judgment that is less favorable than the Rule 68 offer, he is not enti-
tled to receive attorneys’ fees for post-offer work.12
I. Citizen Suits Under the Clean Water Act 
 Many federal statutes—especially environmental statutes—contain 
citizen enforcement provisions.13 These “citizen suit” provisions enable 
private citizens to supplement administrative enforcement of these 
statutes with a judicial remedy.14 Therefore, by “‘standing in the shoes 
of the government,’” plaintiffs who ªle citizen suits provide a public 
service by ensuring that the laws are enforced.15 An example of a citi-
zen suit provision is section 505 of the CWA.16 This Part will explore the 
policies which led to the enactment of section 505 and the history and 
development of citizen suit provisions in general. It will then explore 
one of the fundamental elements of a citizen suit statute—the alloca-
tion of attorneys’ fees. 
                                                                                                                      
12 See Marek, 473 U.S. at 10. 
13 See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (2000); Endangered Species 
Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2000); Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 
1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1270 (2000); Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 
33 U.S.C. § 1415(g) (2000); Deepwater Ports Act of 1974, 33 U.S.C. § 1515 (2005); Safe 
Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (2000); Noise Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 4911 
(2000); Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2000); Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (2000); Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (2000); Emergency 
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 11,046 (2000); Outer 
Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1349(a) (2000). 
14 See S. Rep. No. 92-414, at 79 (1972), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3745. 
15 N.C. Shellªsh Growers Ass’n v. Holly Ridge Ass’n, 278 F. Supp. 2d 654, 667 (E.D.N.C. 
2003) (quoting Friends of the Earth v. Chevron Chem. Co., 885 F. Supp. 934, 940 (E.D. Tex. 
1995)); see also Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 263 (1975) (not-
ing that Congress often uses private enforcement to implement public policy). 
16 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2000). 
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A. History and Development of Environmental Citizen Suit Statutes 
 Environmental enforcement prior to 1970 was “cumbersome and 
ineffective” because administrative agencies suffered from a combina-
tion of inadequate resources and lack of political will.17 Citizen en-
forcement of public rights was not a new concept at this time—in fact, 
the term “private attorney[] general” was used as early as 1943 to refer 
to citizens who sued to enforce public rights.18 For issues where an 
applicable cause of action existed, such as in the civil rights context, 
the citizen suit was a valuable tool.19 Unfortunately, interested citizens 
often lacked an appropriate cause of action to resolve many environ-
mental issues, and therefore had to rely upon common law causes of 
action with varying degrees of success.20
 This situation changed, however, in 1970 when a citizen suit provi-
sion was added to the Clean Air Act (CAA).21 This citizen suit provi-
sion, contained in section 304 of the CAA, served as a model for many 
of the citizen suit provisions subsequently enacted including section 
505 of the CWA.22 Proponents of the CAA citizen suit provision 
thought it would promote greater enforcement not only by providing 
direct enforcement against polluters, but by causing administrative 
agencies, such as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), to act.23
                                                                                                                      
17 Jeffrey G. Miller, Envtl. Law Inst., Citizen Suits: Private Enforcement of 
Federal Pollution Control Laws 3–4 (1987). 
18 Michael D. Axline, Environmental Citizen Suits § 1.02, at 1-3 (1995) (conclud-
ing that “if Congress could authorize the Attorney General to bring an action . . . to en-
force a public right, Congress also could authorize citizens to bring such actions” (citing 
Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1943))). However, this suit involved indus-
trial coal consumers who had an economic interest in the outcome. Id. They were not 
seeking to protect public rights in which they had a noneconomic interest. Id. 
19 See id. § 1.02, at 1–4. 
20 See id. For example, qui tam and public nuisance actions were common in the late 
1960s. Id. 
21 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2000); Miller, supra note 17, at 4; Axline, supra note 18, § 1.02, 
at 1-4. Axline points out the importance of the U.S. Supreme Court’s approval of citizen 
standing to enforce environmental and aesthetic interests in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 
727 (1972). Axline, supra note 18, § 1.02, at 1-4 to 1-5. 
22 Lucia A. Silecchia, The Catalyst Calamity: Post-Buckhannon Fee-Shifting in Environ-
mental Litigation and a Proposal for Congressional Action, 29 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 1, 11 (2004). 
For a description of the legislative history of the CAA, see Miller, supra note 17, at 5–6. 
Miller describes how Congress had a tendency to “lift” section 304 of the CAA and insert it 
into other environmental statutes without much independent debate concerning its en-
actment. Id. 
23 See Kerry D. Florio, Comment, Attorneys’ Fees in Environmental Citizen Suits: Should 
Prevailing Defendants Recover?, 27 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 707, 711–12 (2000). 
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B. Text and Underlying Policies of the Clean Water Act Citizen Suit Provision 
 Section 505 of the CWA permits any citizen to commence a suit 
against any person who violates an efºuent standard or limitation of 
the CWA, or against the Administrator of EPA (Administrator) for 
failing to perform any nondiscretionary duty.24 Prior to ªling suit, the 
citizen is required to give notice to the Administrator and to the state 
in which the violation occurs.25 Then, the Administrator or state may 
ªle a separate enforcement action.26 This furthers the policy that the 
enforcement action should be initiated by the administrative agency, 
but that the citizen right of action serves as a check on that agency.27 
If the agency action is inadequate or nonexistent, the citizen may then 
supplement that action with a citizen suit.28
 In addition to their equitable powers, courts are permitted to im-
pose civil penalties of up to twenty-ªve thousand dollars.29 However, 
these amounts are not paid to the citizen suit plaintiff, but are instead 
paid to the United States Treasury.30 Therefore, in order to encourage 
citizens to undertake the substantial ªnancial burden of bringing an 
enforcement action, section 505, like most citizen suit statutes, permits 
the recovery of attorneys’ fees.31 The court may award costs—including 
reasonable attorney and expert witness fees—to any “prevailing or sub-
stantially prevailing party” whenever the court determines such award is 
appropriate.32 In response to concern that an award of attorneys’ fees 
                                                                                                                      
24 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1), (2) (2000). 
25 Id. § 1365(b). 
26 See S. Rep. No. 92-414, at 80 (1972), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3745–46. 
27 See id., as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3745–46. 
28 See id., as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3745–46. Through the citizen suit provi-
sion, courts are only required to enforce compliance with minimum water quality stan-
dards established by EPA, or nondiscretionary actions by the Administrator. See id. at 79, as 
reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3745. Use of such objective enforcement criteria is in-
tended to simplify citizen enforcement of the CWA in the courts. See id., as reprinted in 1972 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3745. 
29 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(d), 1365(a). 
30 Id.; N.C. Shellªsh Growers Ass’n v. Holly Ridge Assocs., 278 F. Supp. 2d 654, 667 
(E.D.N.C. 2003) (citing Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 608 F. 
Supp. 440, 449 (D. Md. 1985)); S. Rep. No. 92-414 at 79, as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
at 3745. 
31 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d); see Axline, supra note 18, at § 8.01, at 8-2; see also S. Rep. No. 
92-414 at 81, as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3747 (explaining that courts should award 
litigation costs to parties who bring legitimate actions because they are performing a pub-
lic service). 
32 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d). The “prevailing or substantially prevailing” language was added 
by the 1987 amendments to the CWA. Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 
§ 505(c), 101 Stat. 7 (1987). 
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to plaintiffs encourages abuse of the statute, the legislative history indi-
cates that the “whenever appropriate” language allows fees to be 
awarded to prevailing defendants when the action is frivolous or harass-
ing.33 Therefore, the attorneys’ fees provision in section 505 serves 
both to encourage citizens to bring meritorious suits as a public service, 
while penalizing those who bring harassing or frivolous suits.34
C. Treatment of Costs and Attorneys’ Fees 
 Citizen suits are critical to the effective enforcement of environ-
mental laws,35 just as the ability of plaintiffs to recover attorneys’ fees is 
critical to the effectiveness of citizen suits.36 The “American Rule” is 
that each side in litigation pays its attorneys’ fees.37 While there are 
some common law exceptions, most departures from the American 
Rule are statutory.38 This Part explores how Congress and the courts 
allocate the costs of litigation in citizen suits in the absence of Rule 68. 
1. The American Rule 
 The common law American Rule requires each party to bear its 
own attorneys’ fees.39 The rule has been justiªed on the grounds that: 
(1) a system in which the loser pays would deter individuals from 
bringing claims because of the risk of having to bear the opponent’s 
litigation costs;40 (2) the legal merits of a claim are difªcult to judge 
prior to instituting an action;41 and (3) litigation is more efªcient un-
der the American Rule because it does not require a separate pro-
ceeding to determine a fee award.42
                                                                                                                      
33 S. Rep. No. 92-414 at 81, as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3747. 
34 See id. 
35 See Florio, supra note 23, at 712. 
36 See Axline, supra note 18, at § 8.01, at 8-2. “[W]ithout some method of compensat-
ing citizens for the expense of bringing citizen suits, statutes authorizing citizens to bring 
such suits would be virtually meaningless, because no one could afford to exercise the 
power granted.” Id. 
37 Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 245 (1975); Silecchia, 
supra note 22, at 6–7. 
38 See discussion infra Part I.C.3. 
39 See Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 245; Silecchia, supra note 22, at 6–7. 
40 Silecchia, supra note 22, at 7. 
41 Id. at 7–8. 
42 Id. at 8. 
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2. Judicial Exceptions to the American Rule 
 Despite these arguments in favor of the American Rule, the courts 
have recognized that, in some circumstances, shifting attorneys’ fees is 
desirable.43 Consequently, the courts have developed a “bad faith” ex-
ception to the American Rule that allows fees to be assessed against 
parties who act in bad faith.44 A second exception to the American 
Rule is the “common beneªt” exception, which spreads the cost of liti-
gation to those persons beneªting from its success.45
 Despite the existence of these judicial exceptions, the U.S. Su-
preme Court has stated that any further exceptions to the American 
Rule must derive from Congress, not the judiciary.46 However, prior to 
1975, the courts recognized a “private attorney general” exception to 
the American Rule, under which fees could be awarded to litigants 
who act to vindicate important statutory rights of all citizens.47 The 
Court in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, however, ruled 
that only Congress could fashion such a “far-reaching” exception to 
the American Rule beyond the narrow circumstances found at com-
mon law.48 The Court’s historical analysis of the American Rule found 
implicit congressional acceptance of the bad faith and common 
beneªt exceptions, but ultimately led it to conclude that any further 
deviations should emanate from the legislature, not the judiciary.49
3. Statutory Exceptions to the American Rule 
 The Court’s ruling in Alyeska Pipeline left untouched the many 
federal statutes which provided for attorneys’ fees.50 Courts have 
looked to the language in these statutes and their legislative histories 
to determine whether to award attorneys’ fees in a given case.51 Fur-
ther, because the U.S. Supreme Court has held that similar statutory 
phrases are to be interpreted consistently, courts also look to similarly 
                                                                                                                      
43 Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 270–71. 
44 Id. at 245. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 260, 271. 
47 Id. at 245. 
48 Id. at 247. 
49 Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 260, 271. 
50 See id. at 263, 271. For a sampling of the many statutes which award attorneys’ fees 
sorted by the type of statutory language used, see the appendix to Justice Brennan’s dis-
senting opinion in Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 44–51 (1985). 
51 See generally Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680 (1983); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 
U.S. 424 (1983); Christiansburg Garment Co v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, 
434 U.S. 412 (1978). 
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worded statutes for interpretive guidance.52 Thus, while the law of 
attorneys’ fees may not be entirely uniform, there is consistency 
among statutes. Most attorneys’ fees statutes use one or both of two 
formulations:53 the “prevailing or substantially prevailing party” for-
mulation54 or the “whenever appropriate” formulation.55
 A plaintiff is a “prevailing or substantially prevailing party” if the 
plaintiff is successful on “‘any signiªcant issue in litigation which 
achieves some of the beneªt the part[y] sought in bringing suit.’”56 
Plaintiff awards must be reduced if the plaintiff achieves only limited 
success in relation to the relief sought or fails on certain claims that 
are distinct from the successful claims.57 It is not entirely clear from 
the statutes whether forms of success other than a court judgment will 
constitute “prevailing” under statutes with this formulation.58 One 
court decision suggests that only plaintiffs who obtain judicial relief 
are “prevailing parties.”59 However, the question over what constitutes 
“prevailing” should not be relevant in the context of Rule 68, since a 
judgment must be reached in order for the rule to operate.60
 The “whenever appropriate” formulation on its face appears to 
grant a greater level of discretion to the court in determining fee 
awards than does the “prevailing party” formulation.61 However, this 
discretion has been bounded by several decisions and has different 
ramiªcations for parties depending on whether they are plaintiffs or 
defendants.62 Even though the statute in question may not explicitly 
require a party to prevail, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that it is 
never appropriate to award attorneys’ fees to plaintiffs whose claims are 
                                                                                                                      
52 See Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 691. 
53 See Silecchia, supra note 22, at 12–13; Florio, supra note 23, at 716. 
54 See, e.g., Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9659(f) (2000); Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know 
Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 11,046(f) (2000). 
55 See, e.g., Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4) (2000); Surface 
Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1270 (2000). 
56 Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433 (quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278–79 (1st 
Cir. 1978)). 
57 Id. at 440. 
58 Silecchia, supra note 22, at 13. 
59 See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health and Human Res., 
532 U.S. 598, 600 (2001); see also Silecchia, supra note 22, at 13 (noting that the language 
of attorneys’ fees statutes does not speciªcally address whether plaintiffs can prevail only 
by winning in court, or also by other forms of success short of a court judgment). 
60 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 68. 
61 See Florio, supra note 23, at 731–32. 
62 Id. 
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wholly unsuccessful.63 Rather, this language differs from the “prevailing 
party” language by allowing courts discretion to grant attorneys’ fees to 
a party who partially prevailed.64 As long as plaintiffs prevail, however, 
courts will ªnd it “appropriate” to award fees to these plaintiffs, unless 
“special circumstances” exist.65 Therefore, the “whenever appropriate” 
language permits a court to award fees to a partially prevailing plaintiff 
and, under special circumstances, to divest a prevailing plaintiff of an 
attorneys’ fees award, but never to confer an attorneys’ fees award upon 
a nonprevailing plaintiff. 
 Prevailing defendants may only recover attorneys’ fees from un-
successful plaintiffs when a suit is frivolous, unreasonable, or without 
foundation, even though it may not have been brought in subjective 
bad faith.66 The Supreme Court in Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission found that the attorneys’ fees pro-
vision in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which allowed a court to use its 
discretion in awarding attorneys’ fees, only allowed an award to de-
fendants in these limited circumstances.67 In making this ruling, the 
Court explicitly noted that the provision in question was similar to 
section 505 of the CWA in that it allowed courts discretion in imple-
menting the statutory policy.68 Therefore, by implication, section 505 
also restricts fee awards to defendants only in situations where a suit is 
frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.69
                                                                                                                      
63 See Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 694 (1983) (interpreting section 307(f) 
of the CAA, which relates to citizen actions against administrative agencies). 
64 See id. at 688. 
65 Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968); see Christiansburg Gar-
ment Co v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, 434 U.S. 412, 416–17 (1978). For an 
example of these special circumstances, see Chastang v. Flynn & Emrich Co., 541 F.2d 
1040, 1045 (4th Cir. 1976). In Chastang, the court refused to make defendant, the trustee 
of a retirement plan, liable for plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees. Id. The court found that the de-
fendant engaged in no discriminatory act, its liability only occurred due to a change in the 
law, and an award would only serve to hurt innocent plan participants. Id. 
66 Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421. 
67 Id. at 413–14, 421. 
68 Id. at 416 & n.7. 
69 See id. at 416 & n.7, 421. The Court also noted that: 
 In applying these criteria, it is important that a district court resist the un-
derstandable temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by concluding that, 
because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action must have been un-
reasonable or without foundation. This kind of hindsight logic could discour-
age all but the most airtight claims, for seldom can a prospective plaintiff be 
sure of ultimate success. 
Id. at 421–22. 
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 Section 505 contains both statutory formulations, allowing costs 
including reasonable attorneys’ fees to be awarded to “any prevailing 
or substantially prevailing party, whenever the court determines such 
an award is appropriate.”70 Therefore, prevailing or partially prevail-
ing plaintiffs are presumptively entitled to attorneys’ fees absent spe-
cial circumstances.71 However, attorneys’ fees may only be awarded to 
prevailing defendants when a suit is frivolous, unreasonable, or with-
out foundation.72
4. Calculation of Reasonable Attorneys’ Fees 
 Most attorneys’ fees statutes, including section 505, refer to “rea-
sonable” attorneys’ fees.73 A reasonable fee is determined ªrst by mul-
tiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly 
rate.74 The party seeking the award submits evidence of the hours 
worked.75 The court then makes adjustments by excluding hours not 
reasonably expended because they were excessive.76 This starting point 
is commonly referred to as the “lodestar” amount.77
 After establishing this starting point, the court can make further 
adjustments—upward or downward—based upon the result of the 
case.78 Where a plaintiff has achieved excellent results, an attorney 
should recover a full compensatory fee.79 Conversely, if a plaintiff has 
achieved only partial or limited success—succeeding on only some of 
his claims, or receiving only part of the requested relief—then the 
lodestar amount may be excessive, and the court should reduce it.80
                                                                                                                      
70 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (2000). Some argue that the 
addition of the “prevailing or substantially prevailing party” language to the “whenever ap-
propriate” language is somewhat redundant because the provisions are interpreted similarly. 
See Brief of Sierra Club et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellees at 7–14, Marbled 
Murrelet v. Babbitt, 182 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 1999) (No. 98-15788), available at 10 Newburg on 
Class Actions, App. X-B (WL, CLASSACT database); Silecchia, supra note 22, at 13. 
71 See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
72 Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421. 
73 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d); Civil Rights Attorneys Fee Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1988 (2000). 
74 Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 434. 
77 See Peter Margulies, After Marek, the Deluge: Harmonizing the Interaction Under Rule 68 
of Statutes that Do and Do Not Classify Attorneys’ Fees as “Costs,” 73 Iowa L. Rev. 413, 431 
(1988); Roy D. Simon, Jr., Rule 68 at the Crossroads: The Relationship Between Offers of Judgment 
and Statutory Attorney’s Fees, 53 U. Cin. L. Rev. 889, 897 (1984). 
78 Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. 
79 Id. at 435. 
80 Id. at 436–37. 
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 The reasonableness inquiry does not lend itself to any precise 
mathematical rule or formula, but rather relies on a court’s discretion to 
apply the various factors relevant to a particular case, subject to the 
bounds of the “prevailing party” and “whenever appropriate” language.81
5. Treatment of Costs Other than Attorneys’ Fees 
 Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows the prevail-
ing party to recover its costs, “unless the court otherwise directs.”82 
These costs are taxable by the clerk of the court upon one day’s no-
tice, though no deªnition of costs appears in the rules.83 However, 
costs are statutorily deªned and includes fees for the court clerk, mar-
shal, court reporter, printing and witnesses, copies, docket fees, and 
court appointed experts and interpreters.84
 Prior to 1993, the federal rules were silent with regard to attor-
neys’ fees as well.85 The 1993 amendments to Rule 54(d) were de-
signed “to provide for a frequently recurring form of litigation not 
initially contemplated by the rules—disputes over the amount of at-
torneys’ fees to be awarded.”86 Rule 54(d)(2) now contains the pro-
cedural method used to determine any award of attorneys’ fees;87 but 
the grounds for such an award are determined by the appropriate sub-
stantive statute.88 The former language of Rule 54 was revised to ex-
plicitly exclude attorneys’ fees from the enumeration of taxable costs 
routinely awardable to the prevailing party on one day’s notice.89
                                                                                                                      
81 Id. The court also emphasized that “[a] request for attorney’s fees should not result 
in a second major litigation,” and that the fee applicant has the burden of establishing 
entitlement to the fees by proper documentation of hours and rates. Id. at 437. 
82 Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). 
83 See id. 
84 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (2000). The effect of this statute was considered by Justice Brennan 
in his dissent in Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 13–35 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
85 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d) advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment. 
86 See id. This comment undercuts one of the principal arguments advanced by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Marek v. Chesny, which contended that the drafters of Rule 68 con-
templated a deªnition of costs that would, at least in some contexts, include attorneys’ 
fees. See 473 U.S. at 8–9. 
87 Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2). 
88 See id. at (d)(2)(B). 
89 Id. at (d)(1) (awarding “costs other than attorneys’ fees”). 
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II. Offers of Judgment Under Federal Rule of  
Civil Procedure 68 
 Rule 68 is a mechanism intended to encourage settlement of 
claims and avoid litigation.90 It was designed to accomplish these 
goals by encouraging litigants to “evaluate the risks and costs of litiga-
tion, and to balance them against the likelihood of success upon trial 
on the merits.”91 Speciªcally, Rule 68 provides a disincentive to plain-
tiffs who reject reasonable offers of settlement by requiring them to 
pay any costs incurred by defendants after the offer is made.92
 Rule 68 states, in pertinent part: 
[a]t any time more than 10 days before the trial begins, a 
party defending against a claim may serve upon the adverse 
party an offer to allow judgment to be taken against the de-
fending party for the money or property or to the effect 
speciªed in the offer, with costs then accrued. If within 10 
days after the service of the offer the adverse party [accepts 
the offer], thereupon the clerk shall enter judgment. . . . If 
the judgment ªnally obtained by the offeree is not more fa-
vorable than the offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred 
after the making of the offer.93
Evidence of a rejected offer is admissible only in a proceeding to de-
termine costs.94
 Therefore, the terms of Rule 68 indicate that an offer is usually 
irrelevant to the judicial proceeding until a ªnal judgment is entered.95 
A court must then determine whether a judgment is more favorable 
than the rejected offer.96 However, when cases involve injunctive relief, 
the effect of Rule 68 is less predictable,97 causing “inherent difªculty” 
both for courts and plaintiffs who must quantify the relief obtained.98
                                                                                                                      
90 Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 5 (1985). 
91 Id. 
92 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 68. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Thomas L. Cubbage III, Note, Federal Rule 68 Offers of Judgment and Equitable Relief: 
Where Angels Fear to Tread, 70 Tex. L. Rev. 465, 469 (1991). But see infra note 171 and ac-
companying text (noting that some plaintiffs have been successful at obtaining declara-
tions that Rule 68 offers are null and void while cases are still pending). 
96 Cubbage, supra note 95, at 470. 
97 See id. 
98 Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 33 n.48 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting). For a discus-
sion of how courts should approach the problem of determining whether an offer is more 
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 This Part will look at the history and policies behind Rule 68, 
U.S. Supreme Court decisions interpreting the rule, and the limits on 
rulemaking power imposed by the Rules Enabling Act in order to de-
termine if Rule 68 “costs” include attorneys’ fees in a given situation. 
A. History and Policies Behind Rule 68 
 The central purpose behind Rule 68 is to encourage settle-
ment.99 Since plaintiffs are presumptively entitled to costs under Rule 
54(d),100 the Rule 68 penalizes plaintiffs who choose to continue liti-
gating after refusing a settlement offer which was greater than the 
ªnal judgment.101 These plaintiffs must bear their own post-offer costs 
and must pay any post-offer costs incurred by the defendant.102
 While the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were enacted in 1938, 
as recently as 1983 the Advisory Committee acknowledged that the 
rule “ha[d] rarely been invoked and has been considered largely inef-
fective in achieving its goals.”103 One possible reason for this ineffec-
tiveness—suggested by the Advisory Committee—is that plaintiffs’ costs 
were ordinarily too small to provide an effective incentive for liti-
gants.104 Other reasons may include that only defendants make Rule 
68 offers, and that defendants have a greater incentive to defer judg-
ment and earn interest on their money rather than to avoid costs.105 
Subsequent decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court clariªed the inter-
pretation of Rule 68. In particular, Marek v. Chesny increased the in-
centive for defendants to use Rule 68 when their case involves a stat-
ute that deªne “costs” to include attorneys’ fees.106 After Marek, Rule 68 
                                                                                                                      
or less favorable than the judgment ªnally obtained, see Roy D. Simon, Jr., The New Mean-
ing of Rule 68: Marek v. Chesny and Beyond, 14 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 475, 485–89 
(1986). 
99 See 12 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3001 
(2d ed. 1997); see also Lesley S. Bonney et al., Rule 68: Awakening a Sleeping Giant, 65 Geo. 
Wash. L. Rev. 379, 403–14 (1997) (discussing strategic considerations of Rule 68 for both 
plaintiffs and defendants). 
100 Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d). “[C]osts other than attorneys’ fees shall be allowed as of 
course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs . . . .” Id. (d)(1). 
101 See 12 Wright et al., supra note 99, § 3001. 
102 See id. 
103 See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, 98 F.R.D. 339, 363 (1983); Bonney et al., supra note 99, at 380–81; Simon, supra note 
77, at 891. 
104 See Simon, supra note 77, at 891; 12 Wright et al., supra note 99, § 3001. 
105 See Simon, supra note 77, at 891. 
106 See infra Part II.B. 
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applies to attorneys’ fees when such statutes are involved.107 In these 
cases, the economics of litigation can be profoundly altered by this 
“little known rule of court.”108
B. Signiªcant U.S. Supreme Court Precedent for Rule 68 
 In Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
the word “costs” did not include attorneys’ fees for purposes of a pro-
cedural statute which imposed costs upon attorneys who unreasonably 
and vexatiously multiplied the proceedings in any case.109 While the 
underlying dispute involved a civil rights statute that allowed for the 
award of attorneys’ fees “as part of the costs” of litigation,110 the Court 
held that—based upon the history of the provision—the word “costs” 
should be read to mean the deªnition contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1920, 
rather than the substantive statute.111 The Court favored the “uniform” 
approach to awardable costs contained in § 1920.112 Furthermore, the 
Court did not ªnd any evidence of legislative intent to impose attor-
neys’ fees upon individual attorneys in the substantive statute—it 
merely referred to the ability to impose attorneys’ fees upon other par-
ties.113
 In Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, the Court held that the plain lan-
guage of Rule 68 limited its application to only those cases where a 
plaintiff prevails.114 Rule 68 does not apply to cases where judgment 
was entered in favor of the defendant who made the offer; in that case, 
the defendant is presumptively entitled to costs under Rule 54, subject 
to the court’s discretion.115 Therefore, the only possible effect of Rule 
68 would be to divest judges of their discretion in awarding costs when 
the defendant prevails, but there was no indication that the legislature 
intended this result.116 This ruling was intended to avoid situations in 
                                                                                                                      
107 See infra Part II.B. 
108 Chesny v. Marek, 720 F.2d 474, 479 (7th Cir. 1983), rev’d, 473 U.S. 1 (1985). 
109 447 U.S. 752, 756–57, 767 (1980); see 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2000). The statute was sub-
sequently amended to award attorneys’ fees in such cases. Antitrust Procedural Improve-
ments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-349, § 3, 94 Stat. 1156 (1980). 
110 Piper, 447 U.S. at 756. 
111 Id. at 759–60. Section 1920 did not include attorneys’ fees as costs, while the Civil 
Rights statute, the substantive law in the case, did include attorneys’ fees as costs. Id. at 
761. 
112 Id. at 760–61. 
113 Id. at 761. 
114 450 U.S. 346, 351–52 (1981). 
115 Id. at 352–53. 
116 See id. 
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which a defendant makes a small Rule 68 offer—which was unlikely to 
be accepted—for the purpose of obtaining “cheap insurance” against 
costs should the defendant prevail.117
 While August did not involve the question of whether attorneys’ 
fees were recoverable as costs, Justice Rehnquist examined this ques-
tion in his dissent.118 He argued that the Court should look to the 
contemporaneous meaning of the word as it was understood when the 
statute was enacted.119 Justice Rehnquist further argued that the legis-
lative history of Rule 68 did not indicate that Congress meant to refer 
to attorneys’ fees as part of the taxable costs of litigation.120
 However, in Marek, Justice Rehnquist changed his position on this 
issue,121 and agreed with the Court that when the underlying statute 
deªnes attorneys’ fees as costs, they should be included for purposes 
of Rule 68.122 The Court reasoned that the drafters of Rule 68 were 
well aware that there were statutes that allowed recovery of attorneys’ 
fees “as part of costs,” and that it was unlikely that the lack of a 
deªnition of costs was mere oversight.123 The Court distinguished 
Piper by stating that the § 1927 provision included its own deªnition of 
costs in § 1920, while Rule 68 contained no deªnition of costs.124
 After discussing its “plain language” interpretation of Rule 68, 
the Court proceeded to analyze the policy ramiªcations of their con-
clusion.125 Contrary to the appeals court, the majority did not think 
that its result would frustrate Congress’ objective of “ensuring that 
civil rights plaintiffs obtain effective access to the judicial process” be-
cause Rule 68 was neutral and “favor[ed] neither plaintiffs nor defen-
dants.”126 Therefore, the policy of Rule 68 favoring the settlement of 
litigation did not conºict with the policy of the Civil Rights statute 
authorizing attorneys’ fees in order to encourage meritorious suits.127
                                                                                                                      
117 Id. at 349 n.4 (quoting August v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 600 F.2d 699, 701 (7th Cir. 
1979)). 
118 See id. at 376–80 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
119 Id. at 377. 
120 See August, 450 U.S. at 377–78 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
121 473 U.S. 1, 13 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
122 Id. at 9 (majority opinion). 
123 Id. at 8–9. 
124 Id. at 9 n.2; see also Simon, supra note 77, at 913 (distinguishing Piper and Marek by 
noting that history required that the statute be read together with § 1920 which did not 
include attorneys’ fees as “costs”). 
125 See Marek, 473 U.S. at 10. 
126 Id. (internal quotation omitted). 
127 Id. at 11. 
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 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan sharply criticized the 
majority for its apparent inconsistency with Piper and its creation of a 
shifting deªnition of Rule 68 “costs” that would change depending on 
the relevant statute.128 He argued that the limited history of Rule 68 
suggested that § 1920 contained the proper deªnition of “costs.”129 
Justice Brennan further argued that if Rule 68 costs were deªned by 
the substantive statute to include attorneys’ fees, then Rule 68 would 
conºict with the rule that defendants only received attorneys’ fees 
when the suit was vexatious, frivolous, or harassing, fundamentally 
altering the Civil Rights statute.130
 Justice Brennan chastised the majority for carrying the “plain 
language” approach of statutory construction to absurdity, observing 
that many fee-shifting statutes contained slightly different wording 
that would have pronounced effects with no rational justiªcation.131 
He criticized the majority for abandoning the “reasonableness” analy-
sis of attorneys’ fees awards in favor of an automatic, per se rule,132 
and for its assertion that its interpretation of the rule was “neutral.”133 
Instead, he argued that its application will have a deterrent effect on 
civil rights plaintiffs in contravention of Congress’ goals,134 and there-
fore, Rule 68 would violate the judiciary’s rulemaking authority under 
the Rules Enabling Act (REA).135
C. The Rules Enabling Act and the Sibbach-Hanna Doctrine 
 When the Marek Court held that the word “costs” in Rule 68 in-
cluded attorneys’ fees for purposes of the Civil Rights statute, it called 
                                                                                                                      
128 Id. at 16, 19 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
129 Id. at 18. 
130 Id. at 22. 
131 Marek, 473 U.S. at 23–24 (Brennan, J., dissenting). (“[Congress] sometimes has re-
ferred to the awarding of ‘attorney’s fees as part of the costs,’ to ‘costs including attorney’s 
fees,’ and to ‘attorney’s fees and other litigation costs.’ . . . . Congress frequently has re-
ferred in other statutes to the awarding of ‘costs and a reasonable attorney’s fee,’ of ‘costs 
together with a reasonable attorney’s fee,’ or simply of ‘attorney’s fees’ without reference to 
costs.”). Section 505 of the CWA is one of the many fee-shifting statutes which refers to 
litigation costs “including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees.” Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (2000). 
132 Marek, 473 U.S. at 28–29. (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
133 Id. at 31. 
134 Id. at 31–32. 
135 Id. at 35; see Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2000) (mandating that rules 
“shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right”). 
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attention to the debate between substance and procedure.136 The Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure are promulgated by the U.S. Supreme 
Court pursuant to a legislative grant of authority.137 This authority is 
limited by the REA, under which these rules are promulgated.138 The 
REA limits the judiciary’s rulemaking ability to only procedure and not 
substance.139
 Two important U.S. Supreme Court decisions illustrate the 
difªculty in articulating a test of whether a rule affects a substantive 
right and violates REA. The ªrst was Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., which de-
termined that the rule authorizing medical examinations during pre-
trial discovery was procedural, rather than substantive.140 The Court 
attempted unsuccessfully to deªne a substantive right; instead, the 
Court implied that if the rule was procedural, then it did not abridge a 
substantive right.141 The Court said that the test “must be whether a 
rule really regulates procedure,—the judicial process for enforcing 
rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly adminis-
tering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them.”142 
However, this decision was guided by the policy of achieving uniform 
federal procedure, rather than concerns for modifying congressional 
statutes.143
                                                                                                                      
136 See Paul D. Carrington, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 
Duke L.J. 281, 284. 
137 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a); see also Note, The Conºict Between Rule 68 and the Civil Rights At-
torneys’ Fees Statute: Reinterpreting the Rules Enabling Act, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 828, 829 n.7 (1985) 
(describing conºicting views over whether the U.S. Supreme Court possesses an inherent 
power to make procedural rules, whether a statutory delegation of authority is necessary, 
and how to resolve conºicts between the two). 
138 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b). 
139 Id. The line between substance and procedure is important in numerous ways; 
however, this Note will focus on how the distinction affects the judiciary’s ability to make 
rules which conºict or potentially conºict with federal statutory policies. See Carrington, 
supra note 136, at 284–88. Carrington describes other uses of the distinction between “sub-
stance” and “procedure”—the most notable of which are the conºicts in Erie Railroad Co. v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), between federal procedural rules and state substantive law. 
See Id. at 285–86. In federal diversity cases, courts will often ªnd attorneys’ fees to be a 
“substantive” right such that courts will apply the state law rather than federal law. See, e.g., 
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Pac. Indem. Co., 557 F.2d 51, 55–58 (3d. Cir. 1977); Woods 
Masonry, Inc. v. Monumental Gen. Cas. Ins. Co., 198 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1045 (N.D. Iowa 
2002). For a thorough explanation of the distinction between the Sibbach-Hanna doctrine 
and the Erie doctrine, see 19 Wright et al., supra note 99, § 4508. 
140 312 U.S. 1, 11, 16 (1941); Carrington, supra note 136, at 285 n.29. 
141 See Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 11–14; Note, supra note 137, at 830. 
142 Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14. 
143 Note, supra note 137, at 834. 
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 This test proves insufªcient because the line between substance 
and procedure is unclear.144 In Hanna v. Plumer, the Court further ex-
plained the limits imposed by the REA.145 In Hannah, the Court con-
sidered whether a Massachusetts rule for service of process governed 
the case at bar or whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(1) 
should govern.146 Therefore, the Court had to determine whether Rule 
4(d)(1) was within the scope of the rulemaking authority conferred by 
the REA.147
 The Court in Hanna reafªrmed that the analysis in Sibbach was the 
proper method for evaluating the validity of a federal rule of civil pro-
cedure.148 The Court resolved the controversy by creating a presump-
tion that the federal rules were procedural—and therefore valid— be-
cause of the Congressional approval process required to enact a new 
rule.149 This presumption could be overcome only if the Advisory 
Committee, the Court, and Congress “erred in their prima facie judg-
ment that the Rule in question transgresses neither the terms of the 
[REA] nor constitutional restrictions.”150
 For the purposes of this Note, it is not necessary to deªne the full 
scope of a substantive right. It must only be determined whether Rule 
68’s cost-shifting provision modiªes or abridges a substantive right 
when it is interpreted to include attorneys’ fees.151 However, it is 
difªcult to determine whether attorneys’ fees are a substantive right 
for the purpose of REA, since “[s]tatutory fee shifting provisions 
reºect congressional intent ‘to encourage private enforcement of 
                                                                                                                      
144 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965) (stating that Congress has the 
“power to regulate matters which, though falling within the uncertain area between sub-
stance and procedure, are rationally capable of classiªcation as either”). 
145 See id. at 463–64. 
146 Id. at 461–62. Service of process had been accomplished by leaving the court pa-
pers with the respondents’ wife, which complied with Rule 4(d)(1), but conºicted with the 
Massachusetts rule. Id. 
147 Id. at 464. 
148 Id. at 470–71. 
149 Note, supra note 137, at 831; see Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471. 
150 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471; see Note, supra note 137, at 831–32. 
151 Attorneys’ fees statutes have been interpreted as substantive in other settings. See 
supra note 139. Whether Rule 68, when interpreted to include attorneys’ fees, abridges a 
substantive right may depend upon which fee-shifting statute interacts with Rule 68; while 
the Marek Court found no conºict between the Civil Rights statute and the REA, courts 
have not yet found the Marek analysis applicable to section 505 of the CWA. See Marek v. 
Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 7–11 (1985); infra Part III. However, this Note argues that with respect 
to Rule 68, the CWA is indistinguishable from the Civil Rights statute in Marek. See infra 
Part IV.B. 
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statutory substantive rights, be they economic or non-economic, 
through the judicial process.’”152
 The Marek Court sidestepped the REA question, asserting that 
there was no conºict between the Civil Rights statute and Rule 68.153 
The Court reasoned that the Civil Rights statute only awarded “rea-
sonable” fees, and that because the plaintiff’s post-offer legal services 
resulted in a judgment eight thousand dollars less than the offer, fees 
for these post-offer services were per se unreasonable.154 Therefore, 
Rule 68 did not conºict with the Civil Rights statute because it only 
divested plaintiffs of fees for services which were unreasonably in-
curred—fees to which they were not entitled regardless of whether 
Rule 68 “costs” included attorneys’ fees.155 Thus, claiming to follow 
the rule of Hensley v. Eckerhart, the Court looked only to the end result 
of the litigation to determine what fees were reasonable.156
 However, Justice Brennan argued that the Civil Rights statute 
gave the courts discretion to determine reasonable fees.157 He rea-
soned that there were some circumstances under which a plaintiff 
could reject a Rule 68 offer, prevail at trial for an amount less than the 
offer, and still be entitled to attorneys’ fees.158 In effect, the majority’s 
per se rule divested these plaintiffs of fees to which they would be en-
titled in the absence of Rule 68.159 This modiªed the structure of in-
centives inherent in the citizen suit provision of the Civil Rights stat-
                                                                                                                      
152 Petruzzi’s, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 983 F. Supp. 595, 602 (M.D. Pa. 1996) 
(quoting Report of the Third Circuit Task Force, Court Awarded Attorney Fees, 
15 (Oct. 8, 1985), reprinted at 108 F.R.D. 237, 250). 
153 Margulies, supra note 77, at 422 & n.61; see Marek, 473 U.S. at 10–11; see also 12 
Wright et al., supra note 99, § 3001 n.31 (noting that by asserting that Rule 68 was neu-
tral and favored neither plaintiffs nor defendants, the court was able to avoid the REA 
challenge to its interpretation of Rule 68). 
154 See Marek, 473 U.S. at 11. 
155 See id. 
156 See id. 
157 See id. at 37–38 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
158 See id. at 37. 
As interpreted by the court, [Rule 68] will operate to divest a prevailing plain-
tiff of fees to which he otherwise might be entitled under the reasonableness 
standard simply because he guessed wrong, or because he did not have all the 
information reasonably necessary to evaluate the offer, or because of unfore-
seen changes in the law or evidence after the offer. 
Id. 
159 See id. 
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ute.160 Therefore, Justice Brennan argued that Rule 68 modiªed a 
substantive right of the Civil Rights statute in violation of the REA.161
 Accordingly, divesting a prevailing plaintiff of reasonable attor-
neys’ fees appears to conºict with REA.162 Therefore, how one deªnes 
“reasonable” attorneys’ fees becomes the key question. Should “rea-
sonable” attorneys’ fees be deªned by whether a plaintiff’s rejection 
of a Rule 68 offer was reasonable at the time of rejection, or should 
“reasonable” attorneys’ fees be deªned by whether, in hindsight, the 
end result was more or less favorable than the Rule 68 offer? The U.S. 
Supreme Court decided in Marek that the latter approach should be 
taken for the Civil Rights statute and found no conºict with the 
REA.163 This Note examines whether this approach should also apply 
to section 505 of the CWA. 
III. Cases Involving Section 505 and Offer of Judgment Rules 
 Three federal court decisions have examined the interaction of 
section 505 of the CWA and offers of judgment. First, in Public Interest 
Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Struthers-Dunn, Inc., the court held 
that Rule 68 was inapplicable to citizen suits under section 505 of the 
CWA.164 Similarly, in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Chevron Chemical Co., a 
local offer of judgment rule—similar to Rule 68, though enacted un-
der the Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA)—was held inapplicable to the 
CWA.165 More recent is the decision in North Carolina Shellªsh Growers 
Ass’n v. Holly Ridge Associates,166 which is similar to the Struthers-Dunn 
case.167 The plaintiffs in each case sued for violations of the CWA, and 
in each case the offer of judgment rule was held not to apply.168
                                                                                                                      
160 Marek, 473 U.S. at 38 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
161 Id. at 37–38. 
162 But see Christopher W. Carmichael, Encouraging Settlements Using Federal Rule 68: Why 
Non-Prevailing Defendants Should Be Awarded Attorney’s Fees, Even in Civil Rights Cases, 48 
Wayne L. Rev. 1449, 1464 (2003) (arguing that shifting attorneys’ fees does not violate the 
REA because attorneys’ fees are not a “right” under the REA). 
163 See Marek, 473 U.S. at 10–11. 
164 See No. 87-1773 (SSB), 1988 WL 147639, at *5, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 
21,398, 21,400 (D.N.J. Aug. 16, 1988). 
165 885 F. Supp. 934, 940 (E.D. Tex. 1995), overruled on other grounds, Ashland Chem. 
Inc. v. Barco Inc., 123 F.3d 261, 265–68 (5th Cir. 1997). 
166 278 F. Supp. 2d 654 (E.D.N.C. 2003). 
167 1988 WL 147639. 
168 Holly Ridge, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 660, 668; Chevron, 885 F. Supp. at 940; Struthers-Dunn, 
1988 WL 147639, at *5, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 21,400. 
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A. The Struthers-Dunn Decision 
  In Struthers-Dunn, the parties settled their claims for prospective 
injunctive relief; the litigation focused upon monetary penalties for 
past violations of the CWA.169 The defendant tendered a Rule 68 offer 
while motions by both sides were pending.170 Plaintiffs responded by 
moving for a declaratory judgment that the defendant’s offer was null 
and void.171
 In granting the plaintiffs’ motion, the court noted that the tex-
tual approach of Marek v. Chesny 172—examining the statute to deter-
mine if “costs” were deªned to include attorneys’ fees—would result 
in a denial of attorneys’ fees for plaintiffs if they obtained a verdict 
less favorable than the Rule 68 offer.173 The court distinguished Marek 
on the grounds that CWA citizen suit plaintiffs were on a different 
footing than civil rights plaintiffs because the former would not keep 
any money ultimately paid by the defendant.174 Therefore, the incen-
tives for plaintiffs to hold out for greater penalties to the defendant 
were offset by the greater risk of bearing costs.175 Thus, for CWA 
plaintiffs, “there is no ‘upside’ beneªt . . . if they reject defendant’s 
offer, while there is a substantial ‘downside.’”176
 This application of Rule 68 was inconsistent with the legislative 
intent of the CWA because “[s]uch an impingement on a Congres-
sional statute through the application of a federal rule of civil proce-
dure is barred by the [REA].”177
                                                                                                                      
169 Struthers-Dunn, 1988 WL 147639, at *1, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 21,399. 
170 Id. at *1, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 21,399. 
171 Id. at *1, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 21,399. The procedural posture of this 
case is noteworthy, especially for plaintiffs faced with Rule 68 offers. By succeeding on the 
merits at the trial court level in nullifying the effect of Rule 68 prior to judgment, and 
therefore eliminating the risk of losing an attorneys’ fees award, the plaintiffs may have 
signiªcantly enhanced their bargaining position early in the litigation process. Conversely, 
the Rule 68 issue in Marek v. Chesny was decided only after the plaintiffs had obtained a 
judgment on the merits which was less favorable than the offer, triggering the applicability 
of Rule 68. See 473 U.S. 1, 4 (1985). 
172 473 U.S. at 7–10. 
173 Struthers-Dunn, 1988 WL 147639, at *3–4, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 
21,400. 
174 Id. at *4, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 21,400. 
175 Id., 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 21,400. 
176 Id., 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 21,400. 
177 Id. at *5, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 21,400. 
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B. The Chevron Decision 
 The decision in Chevron involved the interaction of section 505 of 
the CWA and an offer of judgment rule enacted by the district court 
under the authority granted by the CJRA.178 Unlike the court in 
Struthers-Dunn, the Chevron court did not have to decide whether the 
district court’s rule included attorneys’ fees as costs, because the rule 
speciªcally included reasonable attorneys’ fees.179
 As a result, the court only had to consider whether the offer of 
judgment provision “would directly conºict with and frustrate the pur-
pose of citizen suits under the [CWA].”180 The court noted that in a 
section 505 action, the “[p]laintiff is acting as a private attorney gen-
eral performing a public service. . . . In performing this public ser-
vice, a citizen has no proªt interest; rather, a citizen may only be re-
imbursed for her costs and attorney’s fees.”181 Therefore, the hazard 
of paying a defendant’s attorneys’ fees and costs would have an unde-
sirable “chilling effect” on the effectiveness of section 505.182
 The analysis of the rule’s effect on CWA citizen suits was similar 
to that of Justice Brennan183 and Struthers-Dunn,184 although unlike 
Rule 68, this rule did confer discretion on courts to reduce the award 
of litigation costs to avoid undue hardship to a party.185
                                                                                                                      
178 885 F. Supp. 934, 936 (E.D. Tex. 1995). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals later 
ruled that the district court rule was not authorized by the CJRA. Ashland Chem. Inc. v. 
Barco Inc., 123 F.3d 261, 265–68 (5th Cir. 1997). The local rule was different from Rule 68 
in certain respects, though not in ways that are relevant to the court’s analysis or for pur-
poses of this Note. See Chevron, 885 F. Supp. at 936 n.1. For example, both parties may 
make offers under the local rule and the ªnal judgment must be less than the offer by 
more than ten percent in order to trigger application of the rule. Id. 
179 Chevron, 885 F. Supp. at 936 n.1; see supra notes 169–77 and accompanying text (de-
scribing the Struthers-Dunn decision). 
180 Chevron, 885 F. Supp. at 939. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. 
183 See Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 31–35 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing 
the deterrent effect of Rule 68). 
184 See Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Struthers-Dunn, Inc., No. 87-1773 
(SSB), 1988 WL 147639, at *3–5, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 21,398, 21,399–400 
(D.N.J. Aug. 16, 1988). 
185 Chevron, 885 F. Supp. at 940. 
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C. The Holly Ridge Case 
 The most recent case analyzing the conºict between Rule 68 and 
section 505 of the CWA is Holly Ridge.186 The defendants served plain-
tiffs with their offer, causing the plaintiffs to subsequently ªle a motion 
to declare the offer null and void.187 The court agreed with the analyses 
of Struthers-Dunn and Chevron, and granted plaintiffs’ motion.188 The 
court concluded that because plaintiffs, acting as “private attorneys 
general,” could not be awarded damages for successful claims, they 
were in a different position than other civil litigants.189 The beneªt of 
the CWA suit would inure to the public instead of the plaintiffs.190 
Therefore, application of Rule 68 would conºict with Congress’ intent 
“‘that enforcement of [CWA] provisions be immediate, that citizens 
should be unconstrained to bring these actions, and that the courts 
should not hesitate to consider them.’”191 This conºict was a violation 
of the Rules Enabling Act.192
 The court noted that their characterization of the plaintiffs as 
“private attorneys general” may appear inconsistent with the standing 
requirement.193 While plaintiffs need to have a personal stake in the 
outcome for standing purposes, the citizen suit serves a broader pub-
lic purpose.194 The broader public purpose—clearly contemplated by 
the legislature—conºicts with Rule 68.195
IV. The Effect of Rule 68 upon Attorneys’ Fees Awards Under 
Section 505 of the CWA 
 This Part explores the effect of a rejected Rule 68 offers upon the 
allocation of attorneys’ fees in citizen suits under section 505 of the 
CWA.196 First, this Part examines whether the holding in Marek v. 
                                                                                                                      
186 278 F. Supp. 2d 654, 666–69 (E.D.N.C. 2003). The parties settled this case in 2004. 
North Carolina Coastal Federation, Historical Highlights 2004, http://www.nccoast.org/ 
about/history/history_04 (last visited Apr. 13, 2006). 
187 Holly Ridge, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 666, 668. 
188 Id. at 667–68. 
189 Id. at 668. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
190 Id. 
191 Id. at 667 (alteration in original) (quoting S. Rep. No. 92-414, at 80 (1971), as re-
printed in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3746). 
192 See id. at 667. 
193 Holly Ridge, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 668. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. 
196 See, e.g., N.C. Shellªsh Growers Ass’n v. Holly Ridge Assocs., 278 F. Supp. 2d 654, 
666–69 (E.D.N.C. 2003) (determining the effect of Rule 68 on a citizen suit plaintiff). 
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Chesny applies to section 505.197 Second, this Part explores the two prin-
cipal rationales behind the Court’s decision in Marek and applies them 
to section 505. Through this comparison, this Part explains that the 
reasoning in Marek is equally applicable to section 505 of the CWA. The 
distinction between the Civil Rights statute in Marek and section 505 at 
best illustrates that the case was wrongly decided, but fails to remove 
section 505 from the scope of the Marek holding.198 Finally, this Part 
concludes by suggesting an alternative approach based upon Justice 
Brennan’s focus on the reasonableness of a rejection of a Rule 68 offer. 
This alternative framework would retain the positive aspects of the 
Marek decision—encouraging plaintiffs to accept reasonable offers— 
while reducing the “chilling effect” on environmental citizen suits and 
providing uniformity to the law of Rule 68.199
A. Critique of Rule 68 and the Marek Decision 
 There has been signiªcant academic inquiry into Rule 68 follow-
ing the Marek decision.200 The rule has been criticized because: (1) it 
does not permit plaintiffs to make a counteroffer; (2) offers must be 
accepted within ten days; (3) an offer can be made before discovery is 
complete, forcing plaintiffs to make a critical decision with incomplete 
information; and (4) the rule’s mandatory nature leaves no room for 
judicial discretion.201 One article notes that “Rule 68 is a sleeping giant 
because its enormous potential to bring civil disputes to an early resolu-
tion is presently overshadowed by its undeªned terms, confusing time 
frames, and many troublesome intricacies.”202
 The Marek decision added new complexity to Rule 68 by hold-
ing that when the underlying statute deªnes the word “costs” to 
include attorneys’ fees, those fees are considered costs for purposes 
of Rule 68.203 Both an argument based upon the “plain meaning” of 
the statutory text,204 and a policy argument support the Court’s 
                                                                                                                      
197 473 U.S. 1, 9 (1985) (holding that Rule 68 applied to “costs properly awardable” 
under the relevant statute). 
198 See infra Part IV.B. 
199 See Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Struthers-Dunn, Inc., No. 87-1773 
(SSB), 1988 WL 147639, at *3, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 21,398, 21,400 (D.N.J. 
Aug. 16, 1988). 
200 See generally Bonney et al., supra note 99; Margulies, supra note 77; Simon, supra 
note 77, at 921. 
201 See Simon, supra note 77, at 921. 
202 Bonney et al., supra note 99, at 430. 
203 Marek, 473 U.S. at 9. 
204 See id. at 7–9. 
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holding.205 Peter Margulies writes that the Marek problem involves 
the interaction of three related policies: (1) vindicating important 
statutory and constitutional rights; (2) promoting settlement through 
alternative dispute resolution; and (3) reducing uncertainty.206 He 
argues that every possible approach to the Marek problem involves 
sacriªcing one of these values.207 This Part will evaluate the Marek 
approach based upon these values. 
1. The Textual Argument 
 The textual argument in Marek can be characterized as follows: 
(1) Rule 68 refers to “costs”; (2) the drafters of the federal rules knew 
that there were many statutes that referred to attorneys’ fees as “costs” 
when Rule 68 was enacted; and (3) for these statutes, the Rule 68 
drafters intended that attorneys’ fees be included in Rule 68 costs.208 
Because the drafters chose not to deªne the word “costs,” the Court 
found that “the most reasonable inference is that the term ‘costs’ in 
Rule 68 was intended to refer to all costs properly awardable under 
the relevant substantive statute . . . .”209
 Justice Brennan criticized the majority for failing to explain why 
the deªnition of “costs” in 28 U.S.C. § 1920 was not applicable, since 
it is a statute that was designed to “‘standardize the treatment of costs 
in federal courts.’”210 He asserted that the majority’s “plain meaning” 
argument, while “‘in a sense logical,’”211 would “produce absurd varia-
tions in Rule 68’s operation based on nothing more than picayune 
differences in statutory phraseology. Neither Congress nor the draft-
ers of the Rules could possibly have intended such inexplicable varia-
tions in settlement incentives.”212 The Advisory Committee’s notes to 
                                                                                                                      
205 Id. at 10–11. 
206 Margulies, supra note 77, at 415, 421–31. 
207 Id. at 415–16, 431. Margulies focuses upon “hybrid” cases in which a given case in-
volves multiple fee-shifting statutes, some of which deªne attorneys’ fees as costs, while 
others deªne attorneys’ fees as separate from costs. See generally id. The situation described 
is similar to the one faced by the Marek Court, which arguably made a policy-based deci-
sion without clear textual guidance. See 473 U.S. at 10–11. 
208 See Marek, 473 U.S. at 7–9. 
209 Id. at 8–9. 
210 See id. at 17–18 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 
447 U.S. 752, 761 (1980)). 
211 See id. at 16 (quoting Chesny v. Marek, 720 F.2d 474, 478 (7th Cir. 1983), rev’d, 473 
U.S. 1 (1985)). 
212 Id. at 14–15. Margulies notes: 
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the 1993 amendment to Rule 54 also supports the conclusion that 
Congress did not consider attorneys’ fees to be included in costs.213
 The “plain meaning” approach in Marek may produce inexplicable 
differences between statutes.214 However, it reduces uncertainty by sim-
plifying interpretation of other statutes—one need only focus on 
whether the statutory language is similar to the language at issue in 
Marek.215 Furthermore, adherence to the “plain meaning” approach 
comports with Rule 68’s central goal of promoting settlement and 
promotes the interests of defendants who wish to settle.216 However, 
achieving these goals results in less effective enforcement of the laws.217
2. The Policy Argument 
 The U.S. Supreme Court’s conclusion in Marek would have been 
particularly questionable had it merely relied upon the textual argu-
ment outlined above. As Justice Brennan pointed out, “plain mean-
ing” can only be carried so far.218 Thus, while the textual argument 
explains why Congress intended the result the Court reached, the pol-
icy argument attempts to explain why such a result makes sense. 
 The Marek Court identiªed the degree of success obtained as “‘the 
most critical factor’” of reasonableness of attorneys’ fees.219 The Court 
implied that the rejection of an offer that is more favorable than the 
judgment is per se unreasonable,220 despite the caution in Hensley v. 
                                                                                                                      
[T]he plain meaning argument in Marek is persuasive only if one believes that 
the legislature was aware of the rule 68 language when it drafted and enacted 
the fee-shifting statute or that legislatures in general have a duty to be aware of 
wording in all prior statutes, rules, and regulations, on pain of courts inter-
preting statutes as imputing such awareness. The ªrst contention is question-
able. The second contention would require the impossible and paralyze the 
legislative process. 
See Margulies, supra note 77, at 424 (citations omitted). 
213 See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text. 
214 Margulies, supra note 77, at 417–18. 
215 This approach can create difªculties when a lawsuit is brought under two causes of 
action with fee-shifting statutes that use different deªnitions of costs. See id. at 425. 
216 Id. 
217 See infra notes 223–26 and accompanying text. 
218 Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 16 n.5 (1985) (listing cases which warn that reading 
statutory text too literally can have results contrary to the statute’s purpose). 
219 Id. at 11 (quoting Hensley v Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436 (1983)); see supra notes 
74–81. 
220 See Marek, 473 U.S. at 10–11. 
2006] CWA Attorneys' Fees and Rule 68 653 
Eckerhart against “mathematical approaches.”221 However, Justice Bren-
nan and others reject a per se approach, contemplating that a plaintiff 
who obtains a judgment that is less than the Rule 68 offer may still have 
acted reasonably in rejecting the offer.222
 Many commentators have argued that the per se approach will 
have a “negative distributional effect” or “chilling effect” on plain-
tiffs.223 Judge Richard Posner has developed an economic analysis to 
argue that Rule 68 will not increase settlements, but rather transfer 
wealth from plaintiffs to defendants.224 While plaintiffs who have more 
to lose from litigation may demand smaller settlements, defendants will 
offer less in settlements, having less to lose from going to trial.225 The 
per se approach ignores the greater risk aversion of plaintiffs faced with 
the possibility of paying costs, especially when those costs include attor-
neys’ fees that they would not otherwise have to bear in the absence of 
Rule 68.226
 If plaintiffs can act reasonably and still lose under the Rule 68 cal-
culation, then it is plausible that they may be willing to accept reduced 
settlement offers to avoid losing awards of attorneys’ fees. Thus, the 
basic difference between the majority approach and Justice Brennan’s 
                                                                                                                      
221 Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435 n.11 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Marek, 473 U.S. 
at 28–29 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
222 See Marek, 473 U.S. at 30 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the per se rule of 
Marek “will require the disallowance of some fees that otherwise would have passed muster 
under § 1988’s reasonableness standard”); Simon, supra note 98, at 500 n.123 (suggesting 
circumstances in which a plaintiff who acts reasonably may have obtained a judgment less 
favorable than the Rule 68 offer, such as “a key plaintiff’s witness may die, disappear, or 
change her story after the offer is rejected, or a persuasive judicial opinion damaging to 
the plaintiff’s case may be handed down after a rule 68 offer is rejected”). 
223 Margulies, supra note 77, at 414–15, 422–23 (1988) (arguing that the Court “treated 
cavalierly the policy that underlies fee-shifting legislation—improving access to justice” by 
ignoring the negative distributional effects on risk-averse plaintiffs that occur in the pres-
ence of uncertainty); see Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 21.12, at 592–
93 (6th ed. 2003); Geoffrey P. Miller, An Economic Analysis of Rule 68, 15 J. Legal Stud. 93, 
94, 105 (1986). This effect is also commonly referred to as a “chilling effect” on citizen 
suits. N.C. Shellªsh Growers Ass’n v. Holly Ridge Assocs., 278 F. Supp. 2d 654, 666–67 
(E.D.N.C. 2003); Friends of the Earth v. Chevron Chem. Co., 885 F. Supp. 934, 939 (E.D. 
Tex. 1995); Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J. v. Struthers-Dunn, No. 87-1773 (SSB), 
1988 WL 147639, at *3, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 21,398, 21,400 (D.N.J. Aug. 16, 
1988). 
224 Posner, supra note 223, § 21.12, at 592–93. “The plaintiff would not turn down a 
Rule 68 offer unless he expected to do better at trial. . . . So the rule penalizes the plaintiff 
only for a mistake.” Id. § 21.12, at 593. 
225 Id.; see Miller, supra note 223, at 94, 105; see also Bonney et al., supra note 99, at 406 
(encouraging defendants to make Rule 68 offers at the earliest possible time for an 
amount equal to the lowest possible outcome). 
226 Posner, supra note 223, § 21.12, at 593. 
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approach may lie in whether or not plaintiffs can act reasonably and 
still lose in the Rule 68 calculation.227 The majority in Marek said that a 
plaintiff who fails to obtain a judgment that is greater than the settle-
ment offer receives no beneªts from the post-offer services of an attor-
ney and, therefore, is not entitled to attorneys’ fees for this work.228 By 
accepting a per se approach the Court ignores instances in which a 
plaintiff acts reasonably and still loses under Rule 68, promoting set-
tlement over the goal of rights vindication.229 This Note will now exam-
ine how Marek affects the interaction of Rule 68 and section 505 of the 
CWA—whether CWA citizen suit plaintiffs are bound by the Marek Rule 
68 post-offer attorneys’ fees decision. 
B. Is There a Difference Between the Clean Water Act and the Civil Rights 
Attorneys’ Fees Awards Act with Respect to Rule 68? 
 Based upon the “plain meaning” argument of Marek, there may be 
no difference between section 505 and the Civil Rights statute, since 
both statutes deªne the word “costs” to include attorneys’ fees.230 Ac-
cordingly, one may expect an uphill battle for citizen suit plaintiffs 
seeking to avoid the operation of the Marek. However, in every reported 
case dealing with this issue, courts have not found Rule 68 applica-
ble.231
 Of the three major cases discussed above, only the decision in 
Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Struthers-Dunn, Inc. de-
voted any signiªcant discussion to distinguishing Marek.232 The court 
ªrst invoked the argument that plaintiffs must face the choice of ei-
ther accepting a judgment they deem inadequate or risking loss of 
                                                                                                                      
227 See supra Part II.C. 
228 Marek v. Chesney, 473 U.S. 1, 11 (1985). 
229 See supra notes 206–07 and accompanying text. 
230 See Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Struthers-Dunn, Inc., No. 87-1773 
(SSB), 1988 WL 147639, at *4–5, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 21,398, 21,399–400 
(D.N.J. Aug. 16, 1988) (stating that according to Marek, plaintiffs would be precluded from 
receiving post-offer fees under section 505 of the CWA if they received a less favorable 
judgment than the Rule 68 offer). Compare Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1365(d) (2000) (“The court . . . may award costs of litigation (including reasonable at-
torney and expert witness fees) to any prevailing or substantially prevailing party . . . .”), 
with Civil Rights Attorneys Fee Award Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2000) (“[T]he court, in its 
discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs 
. . . .). 
231 See supra Part III. 
232 Struthers-Dunn, 1988 WL 147639, at *4–5, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 
21,399–400. 
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attorneys’ fees later.233 Rule 68 would, therefore, have a “chilling ef-
fect” on citizen suits in violation of the policy underlying section 
505.234 However, this argument was squarely rejected in Marek.235
 The court attempted to distinguish the Civil Rights statute on 
grounds that, while a civil rights plaintiff would personally beneªt 
from rejecting a settlement offer if the judgment was higher, this 
would not be true for CWA plaintiffs because any penalties imposed 
upon the defendant would be paid to the U.S. Treasury.236 Thus, 
there is no monetary upside beneªt to plaintiffs, while there is a sub-
stantial downside.237 The defendant in Struthers-Dunn urged that this 
reality makes a CWA plaintiff no different than a civil rights plaintiff 
who seeks injunctive relief.238 However, the court responded that even 
in a civil rights case, the “value” of injunctive relief still inures to the 
plaintiff—not to a CWA plaintiff—and is, therefore, considered in the 
Rule 68 calculus for civil rights plaintiffs.239 Nevertheless, it is unlikely 
that the court meant that CWA citizen suit plaintiffs derived no 
beneªt from these suits. Otherwise, as the North Carolina Shellªsh 
Growers Ass’n v. Holly Ridge Associates court pointed out, these plaintiffs 
may not have had standing to sue in the ªrst place.240
 Courts may try to vacillate and dodge criticism with this “personal 
beneªt” argument, but ultimately it resembles the “chilling effect” 
argument—Rule 68 makes it harder for plaintiffs to bring citizen suits 
when it includes attorneys’ fees as costs and, therefore, contradicts the 
policy underlying citizen suits. The U.S. Supreme Court rejected this 
argument,241 though it was likely in error.242 Furthermore, even if the 
“chilling effect” argument counsels against mechanically applying the 
“plain meaning” approach from Marek, it does not address the other 
                                                                                                                      
233 Id. at *4, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 21,400. 
234 Id. at *3, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 21,400. 
235 473 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1985) (stating that “[c]ivil rights plaintiffs—along with other plain-
tiffs” will not recover attorneys’ fees under this ruling, and that it would require plaintiffs 
to “think very hard” about whether continued litigation is worthwhile) (emphasis added) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
236 Struthers-Dunn, 1988 WL 147639, at *4–5, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 
21,400. 
237 Id. at *4, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 21,400. 
238 Id. at *5, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 21,400. 
239 Id., 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 21,400. 
240 N.C. Shellªsh Growers Ass’n v. Holly Ridge Assocs., 278 F. Supp. 2d 654, 668 
(E.D.N.C. 2003) (“standing analysis requires plaintiffs to have a personal stake in the 
case”). See supra notes 193–95. 
241 Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1985). 
242 See supra Part IV.A. 
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rationale in Marek—that attorneys’ fees incurred in obtaining a judg-
ment less favorable than the Rule 68 offer are not “reasonable” attor-
neys’ fees, regardless of whether the plaintiff beneªts personally from 
the judgment of the underlying dispute.243 While judging reasonable-
ness in this way may be erroneous,244 courts must follow Marek so long 
as it is still good law. 
C. A “Reasonable” Proposal to Reconcile Rule 68  
with Section 505 of the CWA 
 The courts in Struthers-Dunn 245 and Holly Ridge 246 strained to dis-
tinguish the cases from Marek; given the shortcomings of Marek, this 
may be desirable.247 However, when the lower courts held that Marek 
and Rule 68 did not apply to Struthers-Dunn and Holly Ridge, they may 
have done injustice to the defendants who made at least a nominal 
effort to settle their dispute.248
 This section describes an alternative framework for assessing the 
impact of Rule 68 upon fee-shifting statutes that use the “reasonable” 
language, regardless of whether these statutes deªne “costs” as attor-
neys’ fees. This framework evaluates Rule 68 as one element in the rea-
sonableness calculation—not because the word “costs” in Rule 68 in-
cludes attorneys’ fees, but rather because an offer of judgment repre-
sents an opportunity to avoid the costs of litigation so plaintiffs should 
be encouraged to act reasonably.249
 Regardless of Marek, much would remain unchanged from the 
current U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence on attorneys’ fees, even if 
this framework were adopted. If the defendant prevailed in a suit, the 
plaintiff would not be entitled to fees.250 But, the defendant could still 
recover fees from the plaintiff when the plaintiff continued to litigate 
                                                                                                                      
243 See Marek, 473 U.S. at 11. 
244 See supra Part IV.A. 
245 No. 87-1773 (SSB), 1988 WL 147639, at *3–5, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 
21,398, 21,398–21,400 (D.N.J. Aug. 16, 1988). 
246 278 F. Supp. 2d 654, 666, 668 (2003). 
247 This Note does not address the ethical question of whether lower courts should du-
tifully apply U.S. Supreme Court precedent that may produce seemingly unjust results. 
248 See Margulies, supra note 77, at 425. Neither opinion provides the amount of the of-
fer, so it is impossible to evaluate the signiªcance of these efforts to settle. See Holly Ridge, 
278 F. Supp. 2d at 666; Struthers-Dunn, 1988 WL 147639, at *1, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. 
Inst.) at 21,399. 
249 See Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 28–30 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (deªning a 
reasonableness standard that focuses on the plaintiff’s conduct in rejecting or accepting a 
Rule 68 offer). 
250 See Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 694 (1983). 
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a frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless suit.251 Plaintiffs would be 
entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees where the judgment was more 
favorable than the Rule 68 offer, absent special circumstances.252
 Therefore, the only change would occur where a plaintiff receives 
less at trial than offered by the defendant. Accordingly, the court 
should examine the facts of the case to determine whether the plain-
tiff’s decision to reject the offer of judgment was reasonable at the time 
the decision was made.253 The court could establish a rebuttable presump-
tion that fees for post-offer services are not reasonably incurred, but 
allow the plaintiff to demonstrate that circumstances made it reason-
able to reject the offer. The court could consider factors including: (1) 
the difference between the offer and the actual judgment, where a 
small difference points towards reasonableness and a large difference 
points towards unreasonableness; (2) whether discovery was complete 
when the decision was made;254 and (3) whether there was a change in 
circumstances after the offer was rejected, such as the death of a key 
witness or a detrimental judicial opinion.255 Furthermore, a court may 
consider awarding post-offer fees to a defendant when a plaintiff’s deci-
sion to prolong litigation after a Rule 68 offer could be characterized as 
unreasonable or frivolous.256 This structure would provide plaintiffs 
with more security; as long as a plaintiff can show that rejecting an offer 
was reasonable, there should be some recovery of post-offer fees, sub-
ject to the Hensley criteria.257
 Peter Margulies suggests valid criticisms of the reasonableness 
approach, such as tensions with the work-product rule and attorney-
client privilege that would occur when an attorney must prove what 
information was known at different times.258 The problems he identiªes 
with the reasonableness approach are decisional uncertainty and lack 
of predictability in the outcomes a court will reach.259 While problem-
                                                                                                                      
251 Christiansburg Garment Co v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, 434 U.S. 
412, 422 (1978). 
252 See Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (per curiam). 
253 See Marek, 473 U.S. at 28–31 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
254 Margulies, supra note 77, at 438–40. 
255 Simon, supra note 98, at 500 n.123. 
256 See Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 422. Since a plaintiff presumably would still be enti-
tled to pre-offer fees, and a judgment on the merits, this fee award to defendants could 
offset the other amounts paid to plaintiffs. 
257 See supra Part I.C.4. 
258 Margulies, supra note 77, at 430–31. 
259 Id. at 439–40. Margulies notes that the decisional uncertainty caused by the reason-
ableness approach can “discourage settlement, drain judicial resources, and threaten judi-
cial legitimacy.” Id. at 430. While these are valid criticisms, they are inherent in the regime 
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atic, these issues are small in comparison with the problems associated 
with the Marek framework. Although the reasonableness approach 
may cause a drain in judicial resources, this slight drain will result in 
greater protection of the statutory rights served by citizen suits. Mar-
gulies suggests a percentage-based approach that would key a reduc-
tion of plaintiff fee awards to the judgment as a percentage of the of-
fer.260
 One need only look to decisions under statutes that do not 
deªne costs to include attorneys’ fees to ªnd examples of the reason-
ableness approach. For example, in Haworth v. Nevada, the court had 
to decide how Rule 68 interacted with the Fair Labor Standards Act, a 
statute that does not deªne costs as attorneys’ fees.261 The court 
found that Marek did not apply because of the difference in statutory 
language, but held that the rejected offer must be considered on re-
mand in determining the reasonableness of awarding post-offer 
fees.262 The court followed the textual approach of Marek.263 However, 
if the Haworth court had followed the policy reasoning of Marek, it 
would have found—without need for remand—that because the offer 
of judgment was more favorable than the judgment at trial, any post-
offer fees incurred were per se unreasonable.264
                                                                                                                      
of statutes relying upon the “reasonable attorney fee” language, which requires scrutiny of 
the attorneys’ services for reasonableness. See supra Part I.C.4. This may be a workable leg-
islative change to the current Rule 68 regime—trading a reduction in decisional uncer-
tainty in exchange for an arbitrary bright-line rule. 
260 Margulies, supra note 77, at 441–42. 
261 56 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 1995). 
262 Id. at 1051, 1052. 
In the present case, other than the one [Fair Labor Standards Act] violation 
[defendant] conceded, the plaintiffs succeeded on not a single theory at trial. 
And, even on the conceded claim, the plaintiffs failed to recover the damages 
they sought. They recovered a judgment which was close to a quarter of a mil-
lion dollars less than they could have had by accepting the Rule 68 offer. 
Clearly, the only one who beneªted by pursuing the litigation after the Rule 
68 offer was made was the plaintiffs’ attorney. 
Id. at 1052. 
263 See id. at 1051; cf. Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 7–9 (1985) (presenting the Court’s 
textual argument). 
264 Haworth, 56 F.3d at 1051–52; cf. Marek, 473 U.S. at 10–11 (presenting the Court’s 
policy argument). This illustrates another shortcoming of Marek—that depending upon 
which approach a court applies, inconsistent results may be reached. The failure of a stat-
ute like the Fair Labor Standards Act to deªne costs as attorneys’ fees—under the plain 
meaning, textual approach—could be interpreted as legislative intent not to include at-
torneys’ fees as Rule 68 costs. See supra Part IV.A.1. 
2006] CWA Attorneys' Fees and Rule 68 659 
 The reasonableness method is a preferable analysis for the inter-
action of Rule 68 with citizen suits because it harmonizes the dispa-
rate treatment between statutes that deªne attorneys’ fees as costs and 
statutes that do not. The approach also reduces the “chilling effect” 
on citizen suit plaintiffs, while being fair to defendants, because it re-
tains incentives for plaintiffs to accept reasonable offers. Moreover, 
this approach avoids any conºict with the Rules Enabling Act (REA) 
by focusing on the reasonableness of the fee award instead of the text 
of Rule 68. 
Conclusion 
 Citizen suits are important to the enforcement of the CWA and 
many other environmental statutes. Congress has granted the courts 
discretion to use the attorneys’ fee awards contained in these statutes 
to encourage meritorious citizen suits, while discouraging frivolous 
ones.265 The rigid, mechanical application of Rule 68 in Marek v. 
Chesny eliminates the courts’ discretion and divests plaintiffs of attor-
neys’ fees even in cases where the plaintiff has acted reasonably in re-
jecting the offer of judgment. As a result, Marek causes a “chilling ef-
fect” on the effectiveness of citizen suits. Furthermore, because of this 
“chilling effect,” CWA plaintiffs faced with Rule 68 offers attempt to 
avoid Marek’s holding by seeking declarations that Rule 68 does not 
apply to the CWA. These plaintiffs have been successful. Three district 
courts have agreed that the CWA is distinguishable from the Marek 
analysis; no appellate court has ever considered the issue in any re-
ported decision.266 However, in spite of these decisions, the reasoning 
in Marek applies with equal force to the CWA as it does to the Civil 
Rights statute. The district court decisions to the contrary appear to 
be made in order to avoid the “chilling effect” that Marek would have 
on CWA citizen suits, not because of a meaningful distinction between 
the CWA and the Civil Rights statute. 
 Courts should not have to choose between precedent and the 
policies underlying citizen suit statutes. A change is desirable. One 
bill, which progressed very little in the legislature, would have ex-
empted the CWA from Rule 68’s operation.267 Such an approach 
                                                                                                                      
265 See supra Part I.C.3. 
266 See supra Part III. 
267 Clean Water Enforcement and Compliance Improvement Act of 2003, H.R. 1624, 
108th Cong. § 11(h) (2003), 2003 CONG US HR 1624 (Westlaw). 
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would only add to the “schizophrenic” interpretation of Rule 68,268 
and detract from the goal of having uniform rules of civil proce-
dure.269 It also would fail to address the interaction of Rule 68 with 
citizen suit provisions other than section 505 of the CWA. A better 
legislative solution would be to amend Rule 68 and deªne costs so as 
not to include attorneys’ fees. This would render Marek moot, but still 
allow courts the discretion to apply the reasonableness approach as 
contemplated by the drafters of section 505. In the absence of legisla-
tive change, the U.S. Supreme Court would have to overrule its own 
precedent. For such an issue to reach the U.S. Supreme Court, a trial 
court will likely have to ªnd against plaintiffs—often national groups 
that repeatedly bring citizen suits270—in order to give a party 
sufªcient incentive to carry a suit that far. 
 Until change is made, district courts may continue to exercise the 
judicial gymnastics that distinguish section 505 of the CWA from the 
Civil Rights statute. However, fairness to defendants requires that 
these courts still evaluate the reasonableness of rejecting a Rule 68 
offer when calculating reasonable attorneys’ fees, even if Rule 68 is 
found inapplicable to CWA citizen suits. 
                                                                                                                      
268 Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 19 n.9, 21–22 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
269 See id. at 18 (citing Fed R. Civ. P. 1). 
270 Jenny R. Rubin, Note, Rule 68: A Red Herring in Environmental Citizen Suits, 12 Geo. J. 
Legal Ethics 849, 855 (1999). 
